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Prepaid products can become effective instruments for banking the poor since they can be used 
for collecting microdeposits and as a result operate as low cost accounts. Prepaid platforms 
have characteristics that make them especially useful for developing low cost microfinance 
business models. Indeed, customers using prepaid systems do not need bank accounts, debit or 
credit cards. Prepaid issuers do not need to develop or invest in new technologies since this 
mechanism can be used on a number of platforms such as PCs, mobile phones, hand-held and 
set-top boxes. Moreover, prepaid products are especially designed for offering services 
demanded by the poor such as micropayments, microdeposits or even microcredits. Finally, 
they allow users to control their cash flow by receiving statements (some providers offer this 
feature online, others provide physical statements) or accessing balances through PCs, mobile 
phones, hand-held and set-top boxes. 
Other than collecting microdeposits, prepaid products (or SVCs as they are called in the United 
States) also offer other services that can be very valuable for serving the unbanked population. As 
presented in this document, prepaid products generally lack the identification and credit 
requirements that effectively bar millions of individuals from opening traditional bank accounts, 
especially in the United States. In addition, prepaid products can be purchased and reloaded at a 
growing number of locations other than bank branches, such as check cashers, convenience stores 
and other retailers. Prepaid instruments can also provide immediate availability of funds at costs 
that are, in some cases, lower than other alternatives for unbanked consumers; in addition, 
prepaid products are difficult to overdraw, reducing the likelihood of unexpected fees. Finally, 
many prepaid issuers offer some sort of bill pay option, especially branded cards that enable 
signature-based transactions and a significant number offer remittances. 
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1. Introduction: Review of Card Systems 
The emergence of card systems is one of the major drivers that explain the development of 
electronic retail payment systems. Cards can be used for basic payments functions such as cash 
withdrawals at ATMs and EFTPOS (Electronic Funds Transfer Points of Sale), where cash-back 
is offered, and purchases at retailers with EFTPOS. EFTPOS can be physically located at a store 
where the payment is made, or located in a remote location (virtual EFTPOS). Virtual EFTPOS 
allow for additional payment functions such as bill payment, internet purchases or direct debits. 
However, depositing cash in a card (Cash in function) is limited to stored-value (prepaid) cards, 
and depends on the regulation of both stored-value cards and e-money.  
The objective of this technical note is to analyze how stored-value cards could be the basic 
element of a payment architecture that would allow not only withdrawals (at ATMs and 
EFTPOS with cash-back function), and purchases at EFTPOS, but cash deposits as well. This 
payment architecture, coupled with the other elements of the general framework, (Santomá and 
Prior, 2007) and distributed using cellular technology, could form a model for the distribution 
of microfinance services aimed at banking the poor. 
Card payment systems can be classified according to the way transactions are authorized and 
authenticated. First, whether the transaction is authorized using a line of credit, the actual 
value of deposits in the bank account (debit), or the amount of e-money in an internal account 
(prepaid). Second, whether the transaction is only authorized when the acceptance network is 
online or also when the system is offline. Third, whether the transaction is authenticated by 
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These three characteristics determine the types of cards currently available and their payment 
functions. Credit cards were the first type of cards issued in the United States. This product 
allows credit card holders to buy products or services at retailers with EFTPOS for an amount 
less than, or equal to, its credit limit. Additionally, this type of card can be used when the 
EFTPOS is offline, as long as the transaction does not exceed the value determined for this type 
of transaction (this maximum value or back-up parameter is usually large enough to allow for 
the necessary expenses when the customer has no access to an EFTPOS online). The 
authentication mechanism for credit card transactions at EFTPOS has traditionally been 
signature-based. However, in some countries such as France, and recently worldwide due to the 
EMV initiative, EFTPOS will require authentication using the PIN number. The authentication 
mechanism for credit card transactions at ATMs is PIN-based. Cash-back at EFTPOS is not 
currently available for credit cards in the United States. 
Online debit cards were issued later by financial institutions mostly in Western Europe and other 
regions of the world. In the United States its deployment has been slower, due to the importance 
of offline debit, although this is changing progressively. Online debit cards were originally 
marketed as ATM cards to allow cardholders to withdraw money from their bank accounts. As a 
result, every debit card transaction has to be authorized by verifying online the monetary value of 
the bank account linked to the debit card. Transactions will be accepted if the amount of the 
transaction is not higher than the monetary value of the bank account (in some cases including 
its overdraft limit). Debit cards are also currently being used to buy products or services at 
retailers with EFTPOS, although for those transactions to be approved, the EFTPOS has to be 
connected online through its switch to the core banking platform of the issuer. If it is not online, 
issuers in some countries give some back-up parameters to allow micro-transactions while the 
EFTPOS is offline (less than €50
1). In the United States, the authentication mechanism used for 
online debit is PIN-based, which allows the cash back function to be more widely developed. In 
other areas of the world, however, online debit authentication is signature-based, which does not 
support the development of the cash-back function.  
                                              
1 Amount defined by Porteous (2006) as the limit for micro-transactions.  
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Offline debit is a product mainly developed in the United States, and is still predominant in 
terms of debit cards in that country.
2 However, due to the legal process launched by Wal-Mart 
in 2003,
3 its importance has decreased considerably over the past years. Its main difference 
with online debit is that the types of EFTPOS that accept this product are not connected to the 
core banking system of the issuing bank, but instead to the credit payment networks of Visa 
and MasterCard. As a result, the authorization mechanism used verifies the credit limit that 
both payment networks have stored in their authorization databases. This credit limit is 
calculated every few days based on the information provided by the issuer in terms of the 
monetary value of the bank account of the cardholder linked to this debit card. However, is 
does not reflect the exact value online, and therefore generates an overdraft risk for the issuing 
institution if the cardholder spends more than the monetary value of the bank account. The rest 
of the offline debit features are similar to credit cards, since both products are marketed and 
accepted by the same payment networks. To summarize, offline debit cards are credit cards 
(they have credit card BINs
4), but payable the following day by the cardholder (or the number 
of days that the system takes to settle the transactions). 
Stored value cards or prepaid cards are the last type of cards that have been launched in the 
market by card issuers. This product allows cardholders the same payment functions as online 
debit, but the main difference is that the transactions are not authorized by verifying 
the monetary value of the bank account linked to the debit card, but instead the authorization 
process is based on the monetary value of the internal account that the prepaid card is linked 
to. This monetary value is stored in a database that manages this type of internal or prepaid 
accounts. The legal definition of prepaid accounts is one of the most important topics that this 
analysis will cover, as the additional functions that these types of accounts could have if the 
appropriate regulatory framework was applied. The ultimate goal of this study is to analyze 
how stored value cards could be used to collect deposits in a payment architecture where any 
EFTPOS, ATM or other terminal connected online to the payment systems could perform this 
function for any given issuer. However, a basic understanding of how prepaid systems currently 
work is required in order to achieve this goal, as onffined in the following brief description. 
When a consumer buys a product or service using a prepaid card from a merchant, either at a 
physical store (physical EFTPOS) or from an online retailer (virtual EFTPOS), the customer swipes 
or inserts the card in a physical EFTPOS, or inserts the card number in a virtual EFTPOS online. 
The EFTPOS establishes a secure protected connection (Secure Sockets Layer- SSL) with the server 
of the prepaid service provider (PSP). The server authenticates the customer either by using a PIN 
or his or her signature - physical or electronic - and checks the amount of funds available in the 
prepaid account (value of the prepaid account) in order to approve the transaction. The PSP sends 
the information to the merchant regarding whether the transaction has been approved or 
declined; if it is approved, the PSP credits the account of the merchant (only for accounting 
purposes) and debits the account of the consumer. Once the transaction is approved, the merchant 
confirms the purchase and provides delivery details if the transaction is online. 
At the end of the day, the merchant sends the PSP the total amount of transactions approved, 
and the PSP settles the payments the following day (or the number of days agreed upon in the 
contract) by crediting its bank account. The settlement account of the merchant cannot be its 
                                              
2 The Federal Reserve Payments Study, 2004. 
3 Barr, M., “Banking the Poor.” The Brooking Institution. Washington D.C. 2004. 
4 Bank Identification Number – the first six digits of a credit card, which identify the issuing entity.  
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prepaid account since the regulator (when the regulator regulates e-money or prepaid accounts) 
establishes purse limits that are usually too small for merchants. The consumer can load its 
prepaid account using a variety of systems that depend on the local legislation of e-money. 
Usually, prepaid accounts can be loaded online or by phone at a participating retailer, or at the 
branches of the PSP, if it has any. Prepaid accounts allow also the consumer to withdraw cash 
at any ATM connected to the system, at POS connected to the system with cash-back function, 
or at any participating retailer or branch of the PSP.  
Processing POS Payments Using the Prepaid System
5 
 
Prepaid platforms have characteristics that make them especially useful for developing low-cost 
payment systems: 
1.  Customers using prepaid systems do not need bank accounts, debit or credit cards. 
2.  Users do not need to develop or invest in new technologies. 
3.  This payment mechanism can be used on a number of platforms such as PCs, mobile 
phones, hand-held and set-top boxes. 
4.  It is a payment system especially designed for micropayments, microdeposits and even 
microcredits (Banco de Crédito del Perú, Tarjeta Solución Negocios). 
5.  It allows users to control their cash flow by receiving statements (some providers offer 
this feature online, others provide physical statements) or by accessing balances 
through PCs, mobile phones, hand-held and set-top boxes. 
Prepaid or Stored value cards (SVC) use accounts to manage funds in real time through host 
computer systems. The accounts are held in a single concentrator account with different 
subaccounts for each card. Some are “pooled” accounts and some, for accounting purposes, are 
                                              
5 Chepe, 2003. 
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actual bank accounts held by the individual consumer, depending on how the issuing financial 
institution treats the accounts. These cards have similar POS and ATM functionality to regular 
debit or credit cards. However, SVC cards have the additional feature of being reloadable in a 
variety of ways at a range of locations.  That is why SVCs’ functionality closely resembles that 
of traditional bank accounts, and thus the basis of the model proposed. 
2. Review of the Prepaid Industry in the United States 
SVC systems in the United States operate in two ways. One is the “closed-loop” system, which 
can only be used for the issuers’ products or for limited purposes, such as prepaid gift cards at 
retailers like Borders or Starbucks in a closed payment network.
6 The issuer and the merchant 
are therefore the same entity. The second one is the “open-loop” system that offers consumers 
the ability to utilize their cards for multiple purposes, such as making purchases at a variety of 
stores or paying bills. These cards are accepted in payment networks open to multiple issuers, 
where merchants and issuers are different institutions. This open payment infrastructure is the 
basis of bank card systems and therefore currently used for debit and credit cards. 
Closed-loop SVCs were first introduced in the early 1990s and open-loop cards became 
available by the middle of that decade. Closed-loop SVCs were originally used as a payment 
instrument in retail stores (sometimes provided as gift cards), but are also extensively being 
used as a payment instrument in transport systems and mobile telecommunications. Originally, 
retailers and department stores developed this kind of system to avoid paying discount fees to 
merchant banks.
7 Closed-loop SVCs do not belong to payment networks
8 and as a result are 
also called “non-branded cards.”  
Open-loop cards offer consumers the ability to use their cards for multiple purposes in multiple 
locations. Open-loop cards are therefore the equivalent of online debit cards for unbanked 
customers. “Open-loop” cards are accepted in open branded networks such as Visa or 
MasterCard and therefore are called “branded cards.” MasterCard, Visa, American Express 
or Discover branded cards use both signature- or PIN-based authentication mechanisms. 
MasterCard and Visa branded SVCs currently dominate the market, although Discover and 
American Express branded-SVCs are becoming widely available as well in the United States. 
Their competitive position might also strengthen in light of recent antitrust lawsuits brought 
against Visa and MasterCard. Discover, for example, purchased Pulse EFT Association, an 
electronic funds transfer (EFT) network with over 4,000 financial institution members. This 
could have further implications on future branding for SVCs. 
Open-loop SVCs can be grouped into three categories: First, payroll-only cards, which can be 
used only for direct deposit of paychecks or, in some cases, for receiving other automated 
clearinghouse (ACH) deposits, such as Social Security payments; second, reloadable payroll 
cards, which serve primarily as direct deposit cards for payroll checks but offer consumers other 
ways to reload the cards; and third, general purpose reloadable debit cards, which consumers 
can reload in a variety of ways at a range of locations.  
                                              
6 These kinds of closed systems are also called private networks. 
7 Discount rates are paid to banks by retailers, when customers use bank-issued cards to pay for goods at a EFTPOS. 
8 Branded networks such as MasterCard and Visa.  
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Payroll-only cards were thought to be one of the most promising types of SVC products. 
However, they are generally used only for direct deposit of paychecks and other automated 
clearinghouse (ACH) deposits, such as Social Security or disability payments. Typically, SVC 
providers market payroll cards directly to employers, who then distribute the cards to their 
employees. Most SVCs do not currently work in a way that allows a single card to contain all 
levels of functionality-payroll, general spending, etc. Consumers who have payroll cards, for 
example, may not be able, or may be unaware, that they are able to load other deposits besides 
payroll deposits onto their cards. 
Many payroll cards are only set up to accept streams of direct deposits; manual reloads might 
not be available. However, some providers offer reloadable payroll cards. Integrating different 
types of SVCs and adding functionality, such as ability to reload, payroll direct deposit, bill 
payment, and so on, are important innovations for the future of SVCs that would provide more 
benefits to consumers.  
A few recent papers have examined the role of SVCs in serving unbanked and underbanked 
markets in the United States. Frumkin, Reeves and Wides of the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (2003) identified payroll card SVCs that can be used for the direct deposit of 
paychecks, without a necessary link to a bank account, as an innovative product for reaching 
unbanked and underbanked markets, and conducted a survey of financial institutions in the 
payroll card market. However, banks have not taken an active role in the market. They are still 
studying and trying to understand how payroll cards can be sufficiently profitable by 
exploiting cross-selling opportunities with the unbanked.   
The possibility of using SVCs for asset- and credit-building purposes was first raised by 
Seidman and Tescher (2003) in a paper discussing the convergence of the interests of the 
financial services sector and low-income consumers. Seidman and Tescher pointed out the 
growing prevalence of SVCs in low-income markets and the need for greater consumer 
protections and functionality for these cards in order for them to truly mimic bank accounts. 
SVCs could be a valuable financial tool for the unbanked population in the United States for 
several reasons. First, SVCs generally lack the identification and credit requirements that 
effectively bar millions of individuals from opening traditional bank accounts (Bair, 2006). 
Second, SVCs can be purchased and reloaded at a growing number of locations other than bank 
branches, such as check cashers, convenience stores, and other retailers. The ability to load 
cards in multiple fashions at a variety of locations is the key to success for these products and 
therefore retail distributions are key to SVC providers (Barr, 2004). This is why they are 
pursuing partnerships with money-service businesses, convenience stores and other retail 
distribution channels to increase SVC users’ reloading options. Third, SVCs can provide 
immediate availability of funds at a cost that is, in some cases, lower than other alternatives for 
unbanked consumers. Fourth, SVCs are prepaid and difficult to overdraw, reducing the 
likelihood of unexpected fees. Fifth, many SVCs offer some sort of bill pay option, especially 
branded cards that enable signature-based transactions. Since many SVC users are unbanked, 
the functionality of paying bills without using checking accounts or money orders is important. 
However, most bill pay options for SVC users are online or in-person. Additional physical 
options are required, such as self-service bill pay at kiosks in retail locations that could provide 
additional functionality for unbanked consumers (Intelecard News Online, 2004). Sixth, a 
significant number of SVCs offer remittances. This feature allows U.S. cardholders to transfer 
funds to authorized family members in other countries. SVC-based remittance features are 
structured in at least two ways. Sometimes, dual cards are issued to customers, and one of the 
cards is sent to family in another country to access funds from the sender’s “account” via  
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ATMs. Other cards allow cardholders to designate “subaccount” holders in other countries for 
the purpose of transferring money. In these cases, the subaccount holder has access only to the 
money that the primary account holder designates to share.  
2.1. The Development of the Stored Value Card Industry in the United States 
It is difficult to estimate the current size of the SVC market. Closed-loop gift cards are by far 
the largest market segment. However, no publicly available data sources on SVCs exist. Two 
consulting companies have estimated both the dollar volume loaded onto prepaid instruments 
and the number of prepaid cards in the market. Mercator Advisory Group estimated that the 
dollar volume loaded onto “prepaid instruments,” including non-card prepaid instruments such 
as prepaid wireless telephone services was $157 billion in 2003. According to Mercator, the gift 
card and government program card segments were the largest segments with each accounting 
for 25% of the total. The second most important segment in terms of dollar volume loaded were 
the payroll and other employee benefits cards, accounting for 17% of the total, while general 
spending products accounted for 15%.  
On the other side, The Pelorus Group measured the market size based on the number of cards 
issued, counting card products only. In 2003, Pelorus estimated that the U.S. market of open-loop 
SVCs was 15 million “prepaid debit cards.” This study estimated that general spending cards 
accounted for the largest share at 35%, followed by government benefit and child support cards 
at 29%, payroll cards at 25%, and other cards such as flexible spending account cards at 11%.
9  
An increasing number of companies are attempting to compete in the Stored Value Card 
industry in the United States. Currently, the market includes hundreds of marketers, 
distributors, processors and issuers. The number of cards and providers in the market has grown 
rapidly. MasterCard claims to have more than 200 SVC programs of different types with 100 
issuers, and double-digit increases in relationships with third parties and SVC processors in the 
last few years (Martin, 2004).  
Given the various functions involved in offering SVC issuance, transaction processing, funds 
management, customer service and recordkeeping, it can be complicated to define roles and 
responsibilities. For instance, several banks have their own SVC programs in which they use third-
party transaction processors, but many of them also serve as issuers for other non-bank SVC 
programs, which may use different transaction processors. A few SVC providers are vertically 
integrated, handling nearly all of the functions internally, while others outsource everything except 
sales and marketing. The majority of SVC providers outsource the transaction processing to one of 
the many firms that have developed special software platforms for running SVCs.  
The major players in the U.S. market today include bank providers/issuers such as BANKFIRST, 
Bank of America, Citibank and JP Morgan Chase; providers of reloadable prepaid debit cards 
such as Green Dot, NetSpend and Next Estate; SVC processors such as Metavante, StarSystems, 
WildCard and Galileo; providers of back-end services for SVCs, including ATM and POS 
processing; and payroll firms such as Paychex and Comdata. The distinction between products 
that are distributed by financial institutions and those distributed by non-bank firms is an 
important one. Products distributed by banks and credit unions are more likely to have 
                                              
9 Miezejeski, 2004.  
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additional consumer protections, lower pricing (because fewer actors are involved), and more 
obvious transitions into other financial products and services. 
SVCs offer interesting opportunities for banks that see low-balance savings accounts as cost-
prohibitive products. If the SVC industry can figure out a way to offer savings and other 
benefits to previously unbanked consumers, it would be a win-win proposition for customers 
and companies alike. As issuers, banks hold the funds underlying stored value cards in a 
variety of ways. Some banks hold the funds off-balance sheet, in fiduciary accounts. Others 
hold the funds on the balance sheet in pooled accounts, perhaps in the name of the card’s 
distributor or, in the case of payroll cards, in the employer’s name, while still others provide 
individual deposit accounts in the name of each cardholder. 
For large banks, interest in SVC products may be partly due to their greater involvement in the 
payroll card market than in the general spending market. SVCs are therefore sold to employers, 
who offer the cards to employees and provide consumer protections similar to those enjoyed by 
traditional bank account holders. Payroll cards give banks data about customers that could then 
be used for opportunities in cross-selling other bank products. 
On the other hand, certain small regional banks, such as Central Bank of Kansas City and 
University Bank in St. Paul, have created new SVC programs that are intended to serve as 
entry-level products for consumers that might access additional bank services in the future. In 
another recent development, New York Community Bank, the fourth largest thrift in the 
country, has begun to offer SVCs in its branches. The bank is marketing the cards as entry-level 
products, and is also marketing to customers who are denied checking accounts or who prefer 
prepaid instruments. 
Non-bank firms are beginning to replace bank distributors as the protagonists in finding ways 
to add enhanced features to SVCs that could, as the marketplace matures, provide increased 
service to lower-income consumers. Perhaps because of regulatory uncertainty, to be discussed 
later, or a more conservative approach to entering new markets, banks are lagging behind in 
innovation of these products.  
However, the most important remaining challenge for SVC issuers is to determine a business 
model that assures profitability. Issuers do not currently know what features make products 
successful. However, some facts are clear: first, a large scale is needed in order to be profitable. 
Second, in order to develop a profitable SVC business model, CRM (customer relationship 
management) strategies using data mining processes are required. These processes are already 
widely used in the credit card industry, and therefore the synergies between credit card issuers 
and SVC issuers need to be exploited. SVC providers need to take into account how many cards 
are active in their system, how much money is loaded onto each card, how frequently the 
cards are used, the number of transactions occurring each month, and how much unspent money 
is left on unused cards. 
SVC’s main income streams are fees paid by cardholders for activation, maintenance and debit 
transactions, as well as interchange fees from merchants and earnings from float on the funds 
held. The lack of consensus around the key profitability drivers might help explain the wide 
variety of pricing structures and fees levied by SVC providers. The business case has not been 
clearly defined and SVC issuers are unclear on what specifically attracts consumers to stored 
value products. 
Although the increasing competition in the marketplace is driving down the price of SVCs, they 
are still higher than regular bank accounts. The fees that consumers might pay to sign up for  
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and use a general purpose SVC are estimated at $25.45 per month (source: Center for Financial 
Services Innovation, 2007). Costs of a regular bank account are lower. Bankrate.com conducted 
a survey of checking accounts in spring 2003 and discovered that the average monthly fee for a 
non-interest bearing checking account in the country’s 25 largest markets was about $6 (Bruce, 
2003). Therefore an SVC could be a highly expensive option, perhaps even more costly than 
using a check casher for basic transactions. In other cases, however, an SVC with a lower 
pricing structure, or a structure that is consistent with the holder’s usage pattern, could be 
cheaper for certain consumers than using a check casher. 
Prices could come down if additional income revenues were exploited. One potential feature 
that is currently lacking in most SVCs is the ability for cardholders to save and build assets. 
Families with relatively low incomes have assets that could be stored in a savings vehicle 
(Hogarth and Anguelov, 2003), but many of these families may not have access to traditional 
accounts at banks or credit unions. Therefore, demand for savings features in SVC products is 
potentially high.
10  
Research shows that lower-income consumers desire products that provide a safe, convenient 
and inexpensive way to pay bills, make purchases, save, and build credit. For example, a 2000 
industry survey of check-cashing customers showed that 49% would use savings accounts if 
they were available from their regular check-cashing outlets (Eric Mower Associates, 2000). 
Market research in lower-income urban markets showed that an overwhelming majority of low 
and moderate-income consumers, given the opportunity to spend $10,000, would invest the 
money in some type of asset-building opportunity (MetroEdge, 2003). But in order to save, 
lower-income families need a) opportunity, or the ability to access a savings vehicle; b) 
incentive, or the ability to earn interest on funds; and c) motivation, such as direct deposit, 
which makes automatic saving much easier. 
A few SVC companies have experimented with offering savings features with their cards. 
Directo included a savings component as part of the bundled services offered with its card 
program, but the company suspended it in part because few customers were using the feature. 
NetSpend, one of the largest SVC providers in the United States, launched an initiative to link a 
savings vehicle with its SVC. IndiGOCARD started a program linking savings accounts to its 
SVCs but has marketed it as an overdraft protection program. Linkages with savings accounts, 
tax refunds (such as the SVC programs offered by Jackson Hewitt and H&R Block), Individual 
Development Accounts (IDAs), or other savings vehicles through an issuing financial institution 
are possibilities for SVC growth.  
However, SVC companies face important customer barriers to providing unbanked consumers 
with savings opportunities through SVCs. First, savings or credit-building features would 
require more stringent identification verification. This requirement would decrease the relative 
anonymity offered by SCVs, which is one of its most desired features. Second, SVC users may 
not want transaction history data to be reported for credit-building purposes. They may 
wrongly perceive that such data could negatively affect their credit scores, based on their 
previous banking experiences. Third, “saving” has different meanings for different people and 
therefore the product may need to be adapted according to the type of customer targeted. For 
                                              
10 The Federal Reserve Board’s 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances estimated that 60 percent of households at or 
below the poverty level had positive assets, compared to 86 percent of households with incomes between 101-150 
percent of poverty and 95 percent of those families with incomes between 151-200 percent of the poverty level.  
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some, a rebate or a flexible spending account may act as a savings feature. For others, 
“savings” vehicles must address accessibility, tangibility, anonymity, and other concerns.  
However, one of the most important perceived customer barriers to providing unbanked 
consumers with savings opportunities through SVCs is the lack of consumer education in 
appropriate use of such features. Consumers already face difficulties in understanding how 
SVCs work, how fees are structured and how to manage their funds. To solve this problem, 
employees at current SVC distribution points (places of employment, check cashers, retail 
locations) should be more willing and able to explain products to consumers. As a result, 
adding new features such as savings and credit-building features may require a level of 
sophistication and education in consumers that does not currently exist. 
A second potential revenue source for SVC issuers could include adding credit-building features 
to their products. Since cards are marketed primarily to unbanked customers, SVCs have the 
potential to be an effective personal financial management tool for some people. However, very 
few companies are attempting to provide credit-building features, such as “payday advance” or 
overdraft protection tied to an SVC.  
These small extensions of credit, both formal (such as payday advances) and informal (such as 
paying overdrafts on a discretionary basis) could be an additional feature that would add value 
to the issuer’s SVC value proposition. However, even if these products were marketed they 
would not currently help build a consumer’s credit score. Existing credit models do not allow 
for the reporting of credit relationships lasting fewer than 30 days.
11 IndiGOCARD, Eufora 
Credit Builder, and NetSpend CredAbility programs tried to utilize the credit-building 
component as a marketing tool for the cards, extensively advertising this feature and using a 
variety of strategies to try to link SVCs with the credit bureaus. 
The structure of the U.S. credit reporting system therefore presents important barriers for the 
development of credit features tied to SVCs. First, the credit bureaus currently do not accept 
Individual Tax Identification numbers (ITINs), although the U.S. Patriot
12 Act allows for the 
acceptance of ITINs as substitutes for Social Security numbers for credit reporting purposes. 
Second, credit bureaus currently can only collect credit data; debit and SVC data are not 
considered to be “credit.” Some SVC companies have attempted to report monthly fees as “bill 
payments.” However, laws in some states restrict the reporting of bill payment histories by 
utility companies, although the federal Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) allows such reporting 
by financial institutions to credit reporting agencies. As a result, current credit-scoring models 
in the United States do not use SVC-related data. 
International experiences in credit scoring models prove that SVC usage information should be 
used. In many European countries, the practice of collecting deposit data for scoring purposes is 
widespread, but the data is usually limited to the internal system of the financial institution 
(banks cannot view another institution’s customer data). Some have argued that the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA) has prevented financial institutions and other entities to report SVC 
transaction information due to privacy issues.
13 However, as long as institutions follow FCRA 
                                              
11 Fair Isaac Corporation recently announced the development of a new credit score for those with little or no credit 
histories; this credit score may use data on payday loan repayment, although it is unclear how such data would be used.   
12 An acronym: Uniting and Strengthening  America by Providing  Appropriate  Tools  Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. 
13 For example, how much money went into an account and how much came out, in addition to information on 
balances and length of card ownership.  
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guidelines, privacy issues should not stop banks and others from reporting SVC transaction 
data to the bureaus. Nevertheless, this is not presently occurring in the marketplace. 
Adding credit features to SVCs can also generate other regulatory problems. It is unclear 
whether these services should be considered extensions of credit from a regulatory perspective 
and therefore subject to corresponding disclosures and regulations. Moreover, the ultimate 
benefit to the consumer is disputed since the costs of payday lending and overdraft protection 
are so high. Some argue that low-income consumers should be able to access small credit at 
reasonable costs, and that currently theses costs are prohibitive (Center for Responsible 
Lending, 2007). 
2.2. The Regulatory Framework for Stored Value Cards in the United States 
SVC issuers in the United States currently fall under the Money Services Business definition 
(MSB). Persons or entities (other than banks or persons regulated or examined by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission) are required to 
register as Money Services Businesses if they conduct more than $1,000 in transactions with 
any one person on the same day in one or more of the following services: “stored value; money 
orders; traveler’s checks; check cashing; and currency dealing or exchange. In addition, all such 
businesses that provide money transfer services must register, regardless of the amount of 
transactions” (Center for Financial Services Innovation, 2006). 
The federal MSB registration requirement does not apply to a business that is an MSB agent 
(Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2003). However, issuers, sellers, and redeemers of SVCs 
are subject to certain reporting requirements, including reporting of cash transactions 
exceeding $10,000 (“Reports Relating”, 2004). The rationale for the exemption for SVC issuers, 
sellers, and redeemers was that the SVC industry was in its infancy and should not be inhibited 
by premature regulation. As the industry matures, SVC providers should be aware of money-
laundering concerns; those with well-developed back-office systems that enable them to keep 
track of transactions will be better prepared to handle BSA requirements, follow Office of 
Foreign Assets Control rules, create Customer Identification Programs and provide Suspicious 
Activity Reports.  
Money Services Business (MSB) is mostly regulated by state laws. State laws regulating MSBs 
vary widely and have different requirements regarding licensing, making it difficult for some 
SVC providers to use non-bank retail distribution channels at a national scale. SVC providers 
will not achieve real scale in reaching the unbanked unless they utilize appropriate distribution 
channels, such as convenience stores and check-cashing outlets. 
Questions around issues such as the definition of a “branch” and the definition of an “agent” of 
a financial institution are also problematic. The issue of whether distribution points (i.e., retail 
stores that sell SVCs) should register as MSBs under state laws is also unclear. Sometimes, large 
retail or other firms might register for MSB licenses. In other cases, individual franchises might 
have exclusive or non-exclusive agency contracts with SVC providers, further complicating the 
question of who should register as an MSB. In addition to the regulation of agents, some states 
may be considering whether to regulate the issuance of general spending and payroll cards as a 
branch-banking activity, thus requiring issuing institutions to have branches in states in which 
their cards are distributed (Kountz and Gould, 2004).  
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MSB laws are aimed primarily at ensuring the viability of companies that engage in money 
transfer transactions and protecting consumers’ funds in case of failure of the MSB. However, 
state laws covering MSBs show that most do not explicitly cover SVCs. Only
 sixteen states have 
expanded their MSB laws to include prepaid cards; many of these exclude single-use gift cards 
(Kountz and Gould, 2004). 
MSB laws are evolving with the changing marketplace in order to provide protections for 
consumers. However, the question is if and when these various state MSB laws apply to 
companies that solely issue SVCs. If this regulation applies, it should be adapted to the 
complexities and costs related to MSB compliance. In addition, the differences between MSB 
laws across states should be resolved, and MSB regulation applied to SVC issuers should keep 
pace as products and technologies change. 
The fact that SVCs are not bank accounts is often an attractive feature for consumers who for 
various reasons do not desire to have bank accounts. However, SVCs do not have protection 
against loss of funds since they are not considered bank accounts. To solve this problem, the 
FDIC defined in 2004 the circumstances in which funds underlying stored value cards are 
“deposits.” The rule defines a “stored value card” as “a device that enables the cardholder to 
transfer the underlying funds (the funds received by the issuer of the card in exchange for the 
issuance or reloading of the card) to a merchant at the merchant’s point of sale terminal.” The 
FDIC explicitly excludes closed-loop gift cards issued by retailers from the proposed rule’s 
coverage. The proposed rule distinguishes between two types of SVCs: those issued by insured 
depository institutions and those issued by what the proposal calls “sponsoring companies.”  
A “sponsoring company” is an entity other than an insured depository institution that issues 
SVCs; employers that issue SVCs therefore fall into this category. The funds used to purchase 
SVCs issued by insured depository institutions would be considered deposits unless the depository 
institution keeps the funds in a pooled reserve account without subaccounts for individual 
cardholders or other records indicating the amounts owed to individual cardholders. Funds that 
qualify as deposits would be insured on a “pass-through basis”
14 to the individual cardholder (the 
cardholder would be the beneficiary of the insurance in the event of a bank failure). 
The treatment of funds underlying SVCs that are issued by sponsoring companies is more 
complicated. Any funds that a sponsoring company places at an insured depository institution 
for the purpose of making payments on SVCs issued by that company (i.e., funds in reserve 
accounts) would be considered deposits. However, once the sponsoring company has withdrawn 
the funds from its account at the depository institution, the funds would cease to be deposits at 
the depository institution. 
The deposit is either insurable to the cardholder on a pass-through basis or to the sponsoring 
company, depending on whether the FDIC treats the sponsoring company as an agent or 
custodian acting on behalf of the cardholder. In making this determination, the FDIC looks at 
three factors: first, the fiduciary relationship between the sponsoring company and the 
cardholder; second, the cardholder’s interest in the funds either from the depository institution’s 
account records, or from records maintained by the sponsoring company or its agent; and third 
whether the deposit belongs to the cardholder (i.e., whether the agency or custodial relationship 
                                              
14 The FDIC has not clarified whether it insures the pool account or individual accounts for $100,000. That is why 
they are insured on a “pass through basis.” How a customer can prove “fiduciary relationship” or “interest in the 
funds” and therefore that the deposit belongs to the card holder is still a pending issue.  
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is genuine). If all three are answered affirmatively, the deposit is insurable to the cardholder. 
Otherwise, the deposit is insurable to the sponsoring company.  
FDIC insurance protects consumer funds in cases of bank failures. However, it does not protect 
customer funds in the case that a non-bank SVC provider fails. A precedent occurred in the 
United States in 2004, when New York state suspended the license of CashPoint, a bill-payment 
company that signed hundreds of retailers as agents to offer bill payment services, but ultimately 
did not pay hundreds of billions of dollars in bills to utility companies. While the courts advised 
collectors against the practice, consumers who had handled their bill payment through CashPoint 
were ultimately responsible for the funds if collectors chose to seek repayment. 
Regulation E, which implements the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), provides protections 
to consumers using electronic fund transfer (EFT) systems. SVCs were originally not covered by 
Regulation E.
  However, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which is 
responsible for implementing EFTA, revised Regulation E to cover payroll card accounts 
(“Electronic Fund Transfers,” 2004). Banks that issue SVCs may voluntarily provide disclosures 
that describe consumer protections (Frumkin et al, 2003). The Board concluded that payroll 
cards were “designed, implemented, and marketed as substitutes for traditional checking 
accounts at a financial institution,” and that “these cards shared some of the characteristics of 
Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards, which are covered by Regulation E.”  
The question, however, is whether SVCs outside of payroll cards do in fact bear these 
characteristics and could be included in the Regulation E definition. Some of the SVC providers, 
including both payroll and general spending SVC providers, are already providing at least some 
of the protections required by Regulation E, such as limitations on consumer liability for 
unauthorized transfers and procedures for error resolution. Very few, however, were providing 
periodic mailed statements. SVC providers stated that Regulation E’s requirement that periodic 
paper statements be mailed to account holders may be a negative value proposition for SVC 
providers. As a result, permitting alternative ways to deliver statements, such as e-mail, would be 
much less expensive and perhaps more appropriate than periodic paper statements. Indeed, paper 
statements may not be the most effective way of keeping underbanked cardholders informed of 
their balances and transactions. 
Regulation E coverage of SVCs should follow the model provided for Electronic Benefits 
Transfer (EBT) transactions and permit the use of alternative mechanisms for providing 
transaction and balance information to general purpose SVC cardholders. Innovations that may 
also become more prevalent in the near future include text messaging transaction and balance 
information via mobile phone and delivery of paper statements at ATMs.  
After September 11, 2001, financial institutions came under more pressure to keep and report 
accurate records verifying their customers’ identities. Section 326 of the U.S. Patriot Act requires 
financial institutions to be diligent in documenting customer identification. Most SVC providers 
currently require that customers provide Social Security numbers, since major brands such as Visa 
and MasterCard require Social Security numbers for signature-based cards, following the Patriot 
Act requirements. Considering that some underbanked consumers cite privacy as a primary concern, 
the identification requirements may discourage customer acceptance. Customer identification 
requirements is a problem especially relevant for illegal immigrants (Bair, 2006), that could however 
be resolved with pin-based solutions.  
Another emerging issue around the Patriot Act is that some SVC products allow consumers to 
give second cards to family members in other countries as a way to transfer money, and it can  
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be difficult to verify the identity of individuals living outside the United States. The Bank 
Secrecy Act (BSA), administered by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 
requires financial institutions, including banks and money services businesses (MSBs), to keep 
certain paper trails on their customers’ transactions.
 Currently, although they fall under the 
MSB definition, issuers, sellers and redeemers of SVCs are not required to register with FinCEN 
or maintain a list of their agents (“Registration of,” 2004). 
Finally, many states’ labor laws mandate that an employer cannot demand that workers receive 
their pay in a specific manner; payroll cards may be offered as an option but not a requirement 
(Wiley, 2004). Alternatively, employment laws in other states do permit employers to mandate 
worker participation in direct deposit programs as long as the worker can choose the financial 
institution to which the funds are electronically transmitted. 
Most states also stipulate that employees must be able to access their pay without incurring any 
additional costs. Many payroll card products are structured to be offered nationwide and must 
therefore comply with varying state requirements. Apart from the state employment law issue, 
the OCC has also issued guidance on how national banks should deal with payroll cards. The 
OCC is specifically concerned with payroll cards being designed to facilitate payday lending 
programs or other services that the Comptroller deems “predatory” (Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, 2004).  
In conclusion, e-money is not specifically defined in the United States as it is in Europe. 
However, MSBs, or  specifically money-transmitting regulations, are very similar to those 
required in Europe for e-money issuers (ELMIs). Whether the values of SVCs are considered 
deposits in the United States depends on whether the FDIC insures it. Currently, only payroll 
cards are insured by the FDIC. However, the problem remains about general-purpose open SVCs 
where payrolls are deposited. The FDIC has not clarified whether it insures the pool account or 
individual accounts. For this reason they are insured on a “pass-through basis” until the regulation 
clarifies how a customer can prove a “fiduciary relationship” or “interest in the funds” and that the 
deposit therefore belongs to the card holder. 
There is no need to be a regulated institution in the United States (nor an MSB) in order to issue 
SVCs; only to market them. In order to issue open loop cards, SVC issuers need to be a member 
of the branded card systems, thus SVC providers have normally regulated financial institutions 
that issue SVCs. MSB agents are in general not regulated, since no list of agents is required. 
However, MSB regulations are different depending on the state, which is a major obstacle for 
the development of national networks of distribution of SVCs. 
Consumer protection issues pose relevant problems for the development of “open looped” SVCs 
as a low-cost alternative to current accounts. SVC funds are not protected by MSB laws in the 
event of an SVC issuer failure as the CashPoint case shows. Moreover, regulation E and the 
FDIC only protect payroll SVCs in an undefined manner, but does not insure the rest of SVCs. 
Customer identification issues are also a regulatory obstacle for the development of the SVC 
industry. SVC providers require customers to provide Social Security numbers (Patriot Act) for 
open loop cards, which makes “bankarization” difficult. As a result they cannot operate as they 
were “designed, implemented and marketed as substitutes for traditional checking accounts” 
(Federal Reserve Board, 2004).  
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3. Review of Prepaid Industry in Europe 
Europe has made a very important legislative effort to provide electronic money and electronic 
money issuers with an adequate regulatory framework. E-money and e-money issuers are 
regulated by Directive 2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Directive 
2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of  September 18, 2000 on the 
establishment and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions). 
However, e-money issuers are also regulated, as we will see in the following analysis, by The 
Banking Directive (Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of   
March 20, 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions), and 
the recently passed Payment Services Directive (Directive 2007/64/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of  November 13, 2007 on payment services in the internal 
market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing 
Directive 97/5/EC Text with EEA relevance). This document has been produced analyzing these 
legal documents, as well as the Evaluation of the E-Money Directive prepared by The 
Evaluation Partnership for The DG Internal Market of The European Commission in February 
2006. Due to the amount of information available, this document tries to summarize it and 
highlights the most important elements of these documents for the issue at hand. 
However, the recently-passed Payments Services Directive does not resolve the regulatory 
loopholes highlighted in this report, since it clearly states that “This Directive should lay down 
rules on the execution of payment transactions where the funds are electronic money, as 
defined in Article 1(3b) of Directive 2000/46/EC. This Directive should, however, neither 
regulate issuance of electronic money nor amend the prudential regulation of electronic money 
institutions as provided for in Directive 2000/46/EC. Therefore, payment institutions should not 
be allowed to issue electronic money.” 
In Europe, the first prepaid electronic payments were launched in the early 1990s, by non-
banks. However, banks soon reacted (Lelieveldt, 2001) and the European Central Bank started 
demanding measures to regulate the issuance of e-money. The European Commission was 
concerned about the proliferation of national e-money regulations thorough the EU (4- Krueger, 
2002). The EC presented the first draft with the EC explanatory memorandum in July 1998, 
regarding the prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions. After two 
years of consultative process, the commission finally adopted the directive 2000/46/EC on 
September 18, 2000, and Directive 2000/28/EC amending the Codified Banking Directive 
institutions, where electronic money institutions were added to the category of credit 
institutions as defined in Directive 2000/12/EC. 
The long negotiation process resulted in the Commission establishing a separate regulatory 
framework for ELMIs (Electronic money issuers). This new legal framework strived to be lighter 
than the banking supervision, where e-money issuers were being considered deposit-taking 
institutions and modifying the previous positions of the EMI and ECB, although many of their 
proposals were also considered in the final version of the E-Money directive.  
This previous strict regulation limited e-money issuance only to credit institutions (EMI, 1994), 
as argued by the European Monetary Institute when reporting to the Council on prepaid cards. 
Also the European Central Bank and other member states supported limiting electronic money 
issuance to credit institutions (ECB, 1998, Report on electronic money).  
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The use of e-money has remained very limited since the approval of the European Directive of 
e-money, although the use of cashless payment instruments has steadily increased over the past 
few years in the EU. The following table shows how, from 2000 to 2006, the number of cashless 
payment transactions (by non-banks) in the EU rose by 7% per year on average, while the value 
of such transactions rose by 5% per year. The number of e-money transactions has grown also 
very rapidly (at a rate of more than 20% per year), but these still account for only 0.6% of the 
total number of cashless transactions. 
Chart 1 
Use of Payment Instruments by Non-MFIs in the EU (2000 to 2006) 
 























































































However, the analysis of the number of e-money transactions has to take into account that the 
ECB only requires data on card-based products and among these, only on traditional e-purses. 
More recent card based e-money developments such as transport smart cards, prepaid debit 
cards or electronic equivalents of travelers’ checks are not included. Neither the ECB nor 
National Central Banks currently publish data on server-based e-money. 
3.1. Development of the e-Money Industry in Europe 
Certain markets in server-based e-money have developed, but not the in way the E-Money 
Directive was predicting. Most of the issuers are in the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic. The most successful experiences are 
among server-based electronic money, where PayPal is the most relevant case. However, 
disposable and virtual pre-funded cards and mobile-based payment solutions have not developed.  
Prepaid debit cards and electronic travelers’ checks are in many ways similar to more 
traditional payment products. Since they are prepaid, they are regulated by the e-money 
legislation. Prepaid cards are normally issued by traditional banking institutions and therefore 
can be distributed by their networks and used for banked customers in order to pay remotely. 
Commercialization and adoption would therefore not be a problem, although banked customers’ 
demand for this has remained very low. Furthermore, the new security features of traditional 
debit and credit cards when paying through the Internet, such as Verified by Visa, makes them 
even less appealing for potential customers to be used when purchasing online. 
Non-banked customers could, however, be interested in these products when they cannot access 
regular bank accounts. However, given the high level of banking access in Europe (extremely  
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high in Western Europe and increasing in Eastern Europe), demand is not expected to rise, even 
among immigrants. 
The take-up of card-based money has remained even slower. The limited acceptance network 
and limited functionality are its main obstacles to growth. Regulation is not clear either, 
especially regarding transport systems and whether or not they should be regulated and 
therefore considered e-money.  
However, there are two promising factors that can promote the future development of smart 
cards. First, widespread adoption of the EMV standard will resolve the acceptance problem by 
adapting all EFTPOS and ATMs to the new standard. Second, the development of contactless 
technology can help promote the use of cards not only in transport systems, but also in other 
environments, and help define and clarify the business case for a number of providers of card 
based e-money. 
3.1.1. Server-based e-money 
The use of server-based e-money based on cards has been the most prominent form of e-money 
both in Europe and in the United States. Unlike the case of the card-based e-purses (smart 
cards), the funds are not actually stored on these cards but on a server. These products typically 
imply the transfer of centrally stored anonymous claims that have been purchased in advance 
(ECB, 2004). 
There are different types of server based e-money providers based on cards in Europe. First, 
disposable and virtual pre-funded cards designed for online shopping; prepaid cards that, with a 
PIN number or another form of identification, allow the customer to pay online. Examples include 
PaySafeCard (Austria/Germany), MicroMoney (Germany), SNAP Card (United Kingdom), and 
Splash Plastic (United Kingdom). An example of these issuers is SNAP Card, a British company 
currently on a waiver regime until it reaches the critical mass required to achieve ELMI status. It 
is reloadable in 5,000 resellers and allows payments in virtual POS (Internet). Its business model is 
based on appealing to merchants with lower discount fees and better security features. 
Mobile phone based micro-payments are another solution launched in Europe for server-based 
e-money providers based on cards. Payments are made through the pre-payment system of the 
operator. Examples include Crandy (Germany) and Luup (Norway). However, their business 
model is clearly jeopardized by the fact that mobile operators can offer this service without an 
ELMI license. 
Prepaid debit cards have been issued by most of the members of card schemes (banks). They 
have developed various types of prepaid debit cards that offer the same acceptance network as 
branded cards, but are considered electronic money since they are prepaid. They can also be 
offered by ELMIs such as Prepay Technologies Ltd. UK, as well as credit institutions such as 
MasterCard’s Cashplus UK. 
Electronic equivalents of travelers’ checks (common in other parts of the world, new in Europe) 
are worth $20 billion a year. Prepaid as physical travelers’ checks, they offer more security and 
convenience. They can be used in foreign ATM’s to purchase foreign currency and in merchant 
POS. Leading companies in this business such as Amex and Travelex considered setting up an 
EMLI, but decided instead to issue travel cards through banks due to the unclear or inadequate 
regulatory framework discussed before. Structural and supervisory issues, and the limitation of 
investments, reduced the business opportunity for making money on the float.  
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Server-based electronic money was developed by taking advantage of the opportunities offered 
by the Internet. In addition, niche markets have also developed, such as person to person 
internet transactions, online gaming and payment instruments for persons without access to 
bank accounts or credit cards. The most successful are pre-funded personalized online payment 
schemes, involving the transfer of funds stored on a personalized online account (not including 
traditional bank deposits). Access to these systems is mostly carried out through the Internet 
and also sometimes by SMS. 
PayPal has been the most successful. Launched in the United States in 1999, it currently has 
86 million clients. In Europe, PayPal Ltd is an ELMI licensed by the FSA (United Kingdom) in 
2004 and has since transferred to all EU member states. PayPal’s “killer application” is e-bay, 
which purchased PayPal in 2002 and accounts for 70% of all its transactions.  
Another example, although less successful, is Moneybrokers, also based in the United Kingdom 
and founded in 2001. Moneybrokers was the first institution to be granted an ELMI license by 
the FSA in 2002. It runs a similar business model to PayPal but without the killer application 
that has made PayPal so successful. 
3.1.2. Card-based e-money 
Card-based e-money are electronic purses in the form of smart cards, also referred to as 
hardware-based e-money, where the purchasing power resides in a contained hardware-based 
security, generally a chip which is embedded in a plastic card. Despite the fact that a large 
number of debit cards include electronic purse applications, the use of smartcards in Europe is 
very limited. The most important barrier to growth is that they need their own acceptance 
network. However, the upcoming EMV initiative could be the catalyst that will ultimately 
promote the development of these kind of products, since all EFTPOS and ATMs will accept 
smart cards. 
Card based e-money schemes were launched in the second half of the 1990s by banks or with 
the involvement of banks, since they are embedded in debit cards. Usually, these schemes are 
operated by a subsidiary of a group of banks that include this feature in their debit cards. Card-
based e-purses are intended for payments of limited amounts, such as vending, parking or 
ticketing machines. However, they do not allow any other payment functions such as cash in, 
cash out or EFTPOS purchasing.  
E-purses have lower cost transactions for the issuer than credit or debit cards since they do not 
require online authorization (authorization is embedded in the chip), except for Moneo in 
France. However, merchant fees are usually higher, which has prevented its development and, 
as a result, a low success rate for these products.   
Card based e-money increased from 0.4% to 0.7% of total cashless payments between 1999 and 
2003 (Bluebook, 2005). Hardware-based e-money in circulation in the Euro Area (monthly), 
increased by 20% between 2002 and 2005, totaling €453 million in 2005. Software-based 
equivalents (not to be confused with server-based systems) of card-based electronic payments 
systems have been even less successful than chip card-based e-money (ECB, 2004). 
The few successful cases of some e-purse initiatives require a “killer application,” defined as a 
very specific use where the e-money card offers a clear competitive advantage or may even be 
necessary to make a payment in certain circumstances. As a result, consumers only start to use 
e-money when they are practically forced to. Once they have become used to e-money, they  
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use it for other situations. The mere availability of an e-money function on a debit card is 
usually not enough to convince most customers of its usefulness. 
Some functioning card-based e-money schemes in Europe include Proton (Belgium), Chipknip 
(Netherlands), Geldkarte (Germany) and Moneo (France). Proton is operated by Banksys, a 
subsidiary of 34 Belgian banks who include the Proton application on their debit cards and 
issue the e-money. Proton has three dominant applications: first, canteens and vending 
machines in big companies; second, public telephones (initially Proton’s main application); and 
third, general vending machines and parking meters. 
Chipknip is issued by banks and integrated into around 80% of Dutch debit cards, as well as a 
disposable version called prepaid Chipknip that is reloadable. Dominant applications are its 
parking application, representing 90% of the transactions (and therefore a killer application), 
vending machines and catering. 
Geldkarte has e-money chips embedded in debit cards (EC-Karten). However, it has very few 
active users due to its limited acceptance network. Its main uses are vending machines and 
parking meters. 
Moneo is a system operated by SFPMEI, the credit institution in charge of issuing e-money on 
behalf of all participating French banks. Debit cards include the application. However, the 
limited acceptance network has prevented its widespread use. 
Smart cards for public transport, where these cards are accepted as a means of payment by 
different transport companies, also potentially qualify as e-money. Whether they are considered 
as such depends on the organizational set-up, a direct or indirect credit relationship between 
the different accepting bodies and the customers, and the view of national regulators.  
As previously discussed, Transport for London’s smart card (Oyster) is not considered e-money by 
the FSA, despite the fact it is accepted by different transport providers. The smart card operated 
by the Helsinki transport authority requieres no ELMI authorization either. However, more than 
20 transport providers operate under a waiver in the Czech Republic, United Kingdom, Ireland 
and the Netherlands, but they will eventually have to apply for an ELMI license. Currently they 
only offer transport services, but once they have the license they might offer other payment 
services. Transport for London is also exploring this area of expansion. In addition, the increasing 
use of contactless technology enables these smart cards, such as Octopus in Hong Kong, to 
enhance speed and convenience. 
3.1.3. Others products that may constitute e-money 
Electronic vouchers (gift vouchers) are the most important type of SVC (the equivalent of e-
money) in the United States. In Europe issuers of paper-based vouchers (gifts or meal vouchers) 
would like to switch their products to an electronic format. Although in principle they meet the 
features compatible with the E-Money Directive, the ability to redeem poses serious problems 
for their business model. The European regime has prevented issuers such as Amex or the 
French Association of Voucher issuers (APETDS) to issue gift vouchers or meal vouchers. 
Accord is already issuing electronic meal vouchers in Asia and South America, but is unable to 
do it without a partner bank in Europe. 
Mobile network operators also offer prepaid services. As discussed before, the applicability of 
the EMD to mobile operators when they allow customers using their prepaid accounts to buy  
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third party goods and services (digital content such as ring tones, logos, games, etc.) is one of 
the most controversial issues of the current regulation.  
3.1.4. Assessment of the e-money Industry in Europe 
The number of ELMIs in Europe is low (9 ELMIs were active in 2005 according to the 
Evaluation of the Directive). The highest number is in the United Kingdom, due to its adapted 
regulatory framework. A large number of entities are operating under a waiver (72 in 2005 
according to the Evaluation of the Directive). The highest number is in the United Kingdom, 
although only half are active. The second country is the Czech Republic, since transport public 
providers whose travel cards are accepted by other transport providers have to be regulated 
under a waiver (this is not the case in the United Kingdom).  
Credit institutions issue e-money in all EU states. Their products include e-purse schemes like 
Proton or Chipnik card, or server-based schemes offered by a single institution, and prepaid 
cards. Specialized banks also issue the electronic equivalent of travelers’ checks. ELMIs and 
waived institutions predominate in the market for server-based e-money. Banks or ELMIs that 
have close ties to banks issue the vast majority of card-based e-money. The only exception is 
transport cards.  
According to the Evaluation of the Directive, the estimated total value of e-money in 2005 was 
€670 million. The slow take-up of the e-money industry in Europe is mainly due to a lack of 
demand, as mentioned before. First, the lack of consumer and merchant interest due to the 
availability of other methods of secure payment (“Verified by VISA” and “Verified by 
MasterCard”) for e-commerce, and the slow development of e-commerce, has not created the 
necessary killer application in internet payments. Moreover, due to the high level of banking 
access in most European countries, prepaid accounts are not even demanded by the recently 
arrived immigrants (the only segment of the European population that is not almost totally 
banked). As a result of the lack of demand, e-money has neither been used as a new payment 
method nor as a gateway to banking the unbanked. 
Regulation has also played a role in the slow development of the e-money industry in Europe. 
An overly-restrictive regulatory and supervisory regime for ELMIs and a lack of legal certainty 
are the arguments usually employed when analyzing the regulatory impact of the EMD in the 
development of e-money. Furthermore, since the European experience is quite unique in 
developing a regulatory framework for e-money and e-money issuers, it is worth analyzing 
whether the EMD has met its objectives. 
3.2. The Regulatory Framework for Prepaid Products and e-Money in Europe  
The E-Money Directive (EMD) that defines and regulates e-money and e-money issuers has 
been implemented by all 25 member states. The EMD defines electronic money as “monetary 
value as represented by a claim on the issuer, which is stored on an electronic device, issued on 
receipt of funds of an amount not less in value than the monetary value issued, and accepted as 
a means of payment by undertakings other than the issuer.” 
National authorities have tried to differentiate e-money and deposits (or repayable funds), in 
terms of the immediacy of e-money (Porteous, 2006). However, as e-money deposits increase, 
this distinction might need to be reviewed. Some national authorities do not feel that the 
current distinction was clear enough and are calling for account-based e-money to be explicitly 
included into the scope of the Directive.  
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The implementation of the EMD by the different national governments has created variations in 
the definition of e-money that might create legal uncertainty for issuers. Rule number 2, stating 
that e-money has to be “issued on receipt of funds of an amount not less in value than the 
monetary value issued,” was added during the negotiation process on the initiative of the ECB 
“in order to prevent e-money schemes from issuing e-money at a discount and thereby 
potentially expanding the monetary mass in an uncontrollable way.” However, the inclusion of 
this criterion in the definition could create a loophole, and some states have made changes to 
this part of the definition, and this has created national differences. Schemes issuing e-money 
at a discount would fall outside of the definition of electronic money, and would therefore not 
be covered by the directive. 
Some countries, such as Austria, Poland, Sweden and Finland, introduced changes that tried to 
clarify the definition and differentiate between e-money and other products. Finland added a 
reference in which account-based systems also qualify as e-money. These centralized account-
based systems are very similar to the ones used for stored-value cards in the United States. The 
Finnish legislation specifies that “funds repayable on demand received from the public and paid 
into an account where the funds may be used to pay for goods and services being sold by one or 
more companies, and withdrawn in form of cash (customer account)” also constitute e-money. 
The Finnish finance ministry aimed at making this distinction to “ensure technological neutrality, 
making clear that both kinds of schemes would fall within the scope of the legislation.” 
Other member states have specified a general maximum amount (or purse limit) and time limit 
that can be stored on each electronic device/account. The maximum amount depends on the 
country and ranges from €300 (Greece, Denmark and Estonia) to €5,000 (Ireland). On the other 
hand, Hungary determined a maximum validity period of five years. 
The difference between e-money issuance and deposit-taking is clearly determined in Article 2 (3) 
of the EMD that states that “a receipt of funds within the meaning of article1 (3) (b) (ii) will not 
constitute a deposit according to article 3 of Directive 2000/12/EC if the funds are immediately 
exchanged for electronic money.” This provision is very relevant because special requirements are 
set for deposits. However, this provision should be more clearly defined (Kohlbach, 2004 and 
Porter, 2006).  
In practice, all national authorities consider that e-money issuance is not deposit-taking, 
although the distinction can sometimes be difficult. In Belgium and France, e-money issuance 
is not considered deposit-taking but the funds received in exchange for e-money are covered 
within the framework of the deposit guarantee scheme, and are included in the assets used to 
calculate the premiums. However, e-money is assimilated to a deposit only for the purposes of 
the guarantee scheme. 
In the United Kingdom, the FSA regards e-money as spending, not as a savings product, so 
when customers do not hold large amounts it is not considered deposit-taking (in the United 
Kingdom the basic limit is £1,000, however in the case of account-based schemes, where there 
is the possibility of a stolen or lost card/access key being replaced and the issuer can block the 
account, this limit does not apply). In Denmark e-money issuance up to the purse limit of €300 
is not considered deposit-taking. Beyond that limit, e-money accounts are considered deposits. 
Only criterion II of the definition of e-money has been widely modified at the national level in 
order to prevent financial institutions from taking advantage of the loophole. However, there is 
no evidence that it has made any difference in practice, as apparently no e-money issuer has 
tried to exploit it. In some countries, national authorities have tried to clarify the definition of  
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e-money, and in particular the differences with deposit-taking (United Kingdom, Denmark), and 
account-based products (Finland, Sweden). 
3.2.1. Definition of an Electronic Money Institution 
Article 1.3 (a) defines an ELMI as “an undertaking or any legal person other than a credit 
institution… which issues means of payment in the form of electronic money.” Article 2.1 
stipulates that references to credit institutions in Directives 91/308/EEC (1) and 2000/12/EC, 
except Title V, Chapter 2 thereof, shall apply to electronic money institutions. 
When implementing the EMD directive, national authorities have taken two approaches. First, 
the majority of national authorities consider ELMIs a subcategory of credit institutions. 
However, differences exist in the way the rules applicable to traditional credit institutions are 
applied to ELMIs, since the EMD does not explicitly regulate ELMIs in terms of reserve 
requirements, money laundering rules, administrative and organizational set-up, senior 
management arrangements or control systems. For example, in countries such as Austria, 
Germany and France, ELMIS are classified as banks and have therefore the same requirements. 
A second approach used by some national authorities when transposing the definition of an 
ELMI into national law is to consider it a separate category of organizations that issue a 
payment instrument in the form of e-money and have a license to do so. For example,  the FSA 
in the United Kingdom has developed a “specialist sourcebook” based on a risk-based approach 
for e-money issuers that guides the rules that ELMIs have to comply with on a range of issues, 
including their sound and prudent operation. Overall, requirements are much lighter because 
the risks involved are limited, which has promoted the development of the industry. This 
“specialist sourcebook” is the result of the collaboration between national authorities and the 
industry. A new set of rules is also being developed in the Netherlands. 
The EMD leaves no doubt as to the applicability of many provisions of the Banking Directive to 
ELMIs. However, there are national differences in terms of the requirements of “sound and 
prudent management, administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control 
mechanisms,” the United Kingdom so far being the only country (with the Netherlands to follow) 
that has developed a specific set of rules for ELMIs. The more customized the rules, the more 
proportionate they are going to be to the risks involved in e-money issuance. A clear and specific 
set of rules that regulates the industry, such as in the United Kingdom, clearly promotes the 
development of e-money issuers and products. 
•  The EMD sets the following requirements for ELMIs: 
•  Capital requirements: As a result of the long process of negotiations, the minimum 
capital requirement was raised to €1 million. Some industry operators and especially 
MNOs argue that the capital requirement of €1 million set by the EMD is too high for 
the risk they pose. However, some countries have raised minimum capital requirements: 
Hungary (€1.2 million); France (€2.2 million); and Greece (€3 million). In addition, the 
requirement of own funds being at least 2% of the higher of a) the current amount or b) 
the average of the preceding six months total amount of their financial liabilities 
related to outstanding electronic money, is another requirement that has clearly 
prevented the development of ELMIs. 
•  Limitation of investments: All national countries have transposed the limitation of 
investments set by the EMD in its article 5. This article states that the investments have  
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to be of an amount of no less than their financial liabilities related to outstanding 
electronic money in highly-liquid and low-risk assets. However, there are some national 
differences regarding the definition of low-risk assets, which is defined by local 
regulators. For example, the United Kingdom defines liquid assets as investments that 
must have a residual maturity of no more than one year. Other countries, such as 
Germany, do not have the same definition of liquid assets. 
•  Redeemability: The EMD determines that e-money has to be redeemable at par value 
free of charges other than those strictly necessary to carry out that operation. This 
obligation is also the result of the long and complex negotiation where the ECB 
imposed its view, as in the case of initial capital requirements. In any case, the 
minimum fee for redemption should not exceed €10. However, in some countries this 
minimum fee has been lowered, creating competitive advantages such as in Denmark 
(€3.35); Hungary (€2); or Italy (€5). In Poland, national legislators have tried to 
facilitate the existence of e-money even when the funds are not redeemable (gift or 
service vouchers) as in the United States, and outside the EMD framework. 
•  Restriction of activities: The EMD limits ELMIs to activities such as only “issuing 
electronic money, and the storing of data on the electronic device on behalf of other 
undertakings or public institutions.” Some industry operators also think these rules are 
too strict since the final version does not allow the provision of “non-financial services 
delivered through electronic devices.” EU regulation has been transposed without 
changes except for national differences that vary depending on the days of settlement. 
To summarize, very few changes have been made by national authorities regarding the 
definition of ELMIs. The vast majority of member states have transposed the four requirements 
proposed by the EMD to ELMIs. However, higher capital requirements, especially in the case of 
Greece, make the development of the e-money industry difficult. Another obstacle for the 
development of the industry is the lower-minimum redemption values, which makes their 
business models unsustainable. 
Article 6 of the EMD directive states that competent authorities must verify, at least twice a 
year, that ELMIs comply with capital requirements and the limitation of investments. However, 
the frequency is different depending on the country, with Poland being the least strict (once a 
year) and Germany the most (monthly). The low number of ELMIs has meant that reporting is 
still not an issue. 
Article 8 of the EMD stipulates that member states may allow their competent authorities to waive 
the application of some or all of the provisions of the EMD and the application of Directive 
2000/12/EC to ELMIs in cases where at least one of the three criteria is met, and where the 
electronic storage device has a maximum value of €150. However, the conditions for granting 
a waiver were tightened during the negotiation process. The maximum amount of financial 
liabilities related to outstanding of electronic money was lowered to €5 million.  
This article has only been used by some countries, however, and not transposed by all. 
Moreover, every country has set different conditions and a different process for granting 
waivers. There are also differences in terms of what provisions can be waived. The most widely-
used waiver criterion is the float size limit [EMD, article 8.1 (a)]. The non-implementation of 
this criterion is likely to significantly reduce the usefulness of the waiver regime. As for the 
process, the automatic granting of the waiver would seem to lead to its more widespread use.  
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3.2.2. Problems with the Applicability of the EMD Directive to Issuers of Prepaid Accounts 
The applicability of the EMD to issuers whose core business is not to offer electronic payment 
services but to complement their services, such as mobile network operators (MNOs), is one of 
the most controversial issues not yet resolved by the EMD. These operators offer their customers 
the possibility to pay for third party goods and services using their prepaid mobile telephone 
funds. 
This debate led to a formal consultation that resulted in the issuance of the Guidance Note by 
the EC in early 2005. The result was that most of the national authorities argued that there was 
a need to at least broaden the definition, even perhaps to develop a new hybrid category. 
However, mobile operators argued that there was no need for a new expanded ELMI definition, 
and that the New Legal Framework for Payments that resulted in the recently-approved 
Payments Service Directive would be sufficient to cover the issue. However, as argued before, 
the Payment Service Directive does not solve the issue since it clearly states that “this directive 
should, however, neither regulate issuance of electronic money nor amend the prudential 
regulation of electronic money institutions as provided for in Directive 2000/46/EC.” 
Mobile network operators (MNOs) currently offer the possibility of purchasing goods or services 
(especially in the form of digital content, e.g. ring tones, logos, games, etc.) from third parties. 
While the EMD is not applied to these kinds of schemes at present, the regulations differ from 
one member state to another. Several member states (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland and the United Kingdom) have followed the EC Guidance Note that states that schemes 
where there is no direct debtor-creditor relationship between the third party merchant and the 
customer are not e-money. In practice, this means that MNOs are exempt from the EMD as long 
as this condition is met. In the United Kingdom the main points of the Guidance Note were 
incorporated into the FSA rulebook.  
Other member states (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal) have decided not 
to apply the EMD to MNOs for the time being, but are awaiting further guidance and 
clarification at the EU level. For a number of member states, the problem does not appear 
(Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia) since MNOs are currently not issuing e-money in their 
respective countries. The Belgian authorities have interpreted that, even in prepaid schemes 
where there is allegedly no direct relationship between the customer and a third-party 
merchant, such products would have to be classified as e-money. 
As an example of the impact of the current unclear legal situation of MNOs on new initiatives, 
we have the case of Simpay. Simpay was a joint venture by four mobile network operators 
(Orange, Telefónica, T-Mobile and Vodafone) to provide a single solution for small-value digital 
payments. In mid-2005, the participants decided to discontinue the project, mainly due to 
diverging views as to the concrete design of the product. However, dealing with the unclear 
legal and regulatory framework was one of the issues that was left for a later stage and 
remained unresolved. 
Simpay participants had different impressions as to whether the EMD would be applicable to 
the joint venture in their respective countries. Depending on the business model agreed, setting 
up a new entity as an ELMI would have been required. This would have created additional 
problems and might have made the product less attractive, especially because mobile phone 
customers could not have used the Simpay product directly, but would have been required to 
register with the new entity.  
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Other cases where the national interpretation of what constitutes e-money varies, and creates 
unclear regulatory frameworks, are certain account-based schemes. PayPal, for example, is 
licensed as an ELMI in the United Kingdom, but the German authorities think that such schemes 
should operate under a full banking license. 
Electronic service vouchers also pose serious problems for the applicability of the EMD.  Issuers 
of service vouchers such as Accor, that wish to provide them in electronic format, face different 
national regulations that would make their development difficult. The British and Belgian 
regulators have stated that they would not consider such products e-money, but the authorities 
in most other countries were unsure whether they would have to apply the EMD rules to them. 
Smartcards for public transport are another product where there are serious problems for the 
applicability of the EMD. Smartcards that are used exclusively to pay for public transport, but are 
accepted by several different transport providers, fall under the scope of the EMD. In Ireland and 
the Netherlands, such schemes need an ELMI license. In the United Kingdom, however, Transport 
for London is not considered to be issuing e-money at present, while a similar, smaller scheme 
has been granted a small e-money issuer certificate. In the Czech Republic, more than 20 public 
transport operators are operating under a waiver, whereas the Finnish authorities were 
approached by a transport operator, but considered no license or waiver was necessary.  
In conclusion, applicability of the EMD to certain issuers of prepaid accounts is one the most 
controversial issues of the EMD. This controversy is especially relevant with regard to MNOs, 
where almost all member states have exempted these de facto from the application of the EMD 
for the time being. In some member states, the decision was based on the criteria outlined in the 
EC Guidance Note. In others the situation remains unclear from a legal point of view, and the 
de facto exemption is only seen as a temporary solution until further clarification is provided. A 
final group of member states report that MNOs currently do not offer their customers the 
possibility of paying for third party goods and services, or that the situation has not yet been 
discussed in depth. 
However, regulation needs to be clarified in order to accommodate two competing industry 
groups. MNOs argue that the application of the EMD to their prepaid business would be 
disproportionate to the risks, and would fail to recognize that third party payments only 
account for a very small percentage of prepaid funds (and these are limited to micropayments 
for mostly telecoms-related goods and services). Besides, they argue, the provisions of the EMD 
are not appropriate for the kind of service they provide, since they are very costly to 
implement, difficult to explain to customers, and might ultimately mean that MNOs would have 
to completely stop offering the possibility of using prepaid funds to pay for third party goods 
and services. 
On the other hand, a significant number of e-money firms argue that the non-application of the 
EMD to MNOs creates an uneven playing field and distorts competition. They emphasize that 
some form of proportionate regulation applicable to MNOs (and other hybrid issuers) is vital to 
ensuring fair competition among schemes that often offer similar payment products. 
3.2.3. Anti-money Laundering Rules and Reserve Requirements Supervision 
Anti-money laundering rules and reserve requirements are not explicitly dealt with in the EMD, 
so the rules applicable in the different national markets differ and have an impact on the  
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development of the market. The EMD refers to the rules contained in the relevant banking 
directives. 
Regarding anti-money laundering rules, there are two general approaches. The majority of 
countries apply the same anti-money laundering rules to ELMIs, and waived institutions as they 
do to banks, since many countries do not have ELMIs or waived institutions. The general 
criterion applied is Directive 2005/60/EC, Article 10 that proposes a risk-based approach to 
money laundering. In practice it means that issuers will not be required to verify the identity of 
their customers until the total turnover of an e-money account exceeds €2,500. However, how 
these rules are applied to instruments such as anonymous cards is unclear. 
Countries that do have ELMIs or waived institutions implement pragmatic approaches. Czech 
and Danish authorities determined that there was no need to identify the customers of e-money 
cards. In Germany, rules are negotiated with each ELMI applicant, which can make the process 
very difficult. 
Other countries such as the United Kingdom have developed explicit rules that apply to e-money 
instruments, whether they are issued by ELMIs, waived institutions or banks. In the United 
Kingdom, the FSA has created a Joint Money Laundering Steering Group based on a proportionate 
risk-based approach. In practice, it means that the identity of the customer does not need to be 
verified upfront (when the e-money account is opened or the card bought). Verification is 
undertaken only when the amount withdrawn/redeemed or the total turnover exceeds £5,000. 
However, the identity of the merchant accepting e-money must always be verified. 
In Belgium and France, the identity of the customer does not need to be verified if maximum 
storage is €150; and the limit or the individual transaction is €30 (France only). In Italy, the 
purse limit for anonymous e-money instruments was set at €500. 
In terms of reserve requirements, some countries outside the Euro zone do not impose reserve 
requirements (Denmark, Estonia, and United Kingdom). In the Euro zone the ECB considers 
ELMIs a subcategory of credit institutions and therefore, according to article 19.1 of the statue 
of the ECB, it allows the ECB to require minimum reserves. However, in practice they are 
exempt due to the low volume of business. 
To summarize, strict anti-money laundering rules are likely to have a negative impact on the 
development of the industry. However, until now it has not been a problem due to the low 
volume of business. The United Kingdom has the most flexible approach where issuers are 
exempted from strict “know your customer” approaches as long as the turnover does not exceed 
£5,000 or the e-money is redeemed. With the 3
rd money laundering directive, this approach 
could be extended to all European countries. However, national differences will remain in terms 
of what forms of customer identification are accepted. This issue can therefore remain an issue 
as it currently is in the United States. 
3.2.4. Evaluation of the Directives Results 
According to the preface of the EMD, the main objectives of the directive were: First, to create 
legal certainty and contribute to the development of e-commerce. Second, avoid hampering 
technological innovation. Third, preserve a level a playing field. Fourth, ensure the stability and 
soundness of issuers. Fifth, facilitate access by ELMIS from one member state into other 
member state.  
  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 27 
•  Create legal certainty and contribute to the development of e-commerce: 
The EMD provides a definition of “electronic money” (article 1.3) and it specifies the regulatory 
and supervisory framework. It also provides harmonization by mutual recognition of 
authorization (recital 4) “The approach adopted is appropriate to achieve only the essential 
harmonization necessary and sufficient to secure the mutual recognition of authorization and 
prudential supervision of electronic money institutions, making possible the granting of a 
single license recognized throughout the Community and designed to ensure bearer confidence 
and the application of the principle of home Member State prudential supervision.” 
However, although the EMD has successfully created a legal framework for e-money, some 
questions remain regarding the legal certainty required to apply the EMD to certain services 
such as account-based schemes (there is an important degree of disparity between national 
authorities regarding whether or not they should be considered e-money; Finland has resolved 
the problem by including an explicit mention of account-based systems); electronic vouchers; 
prepaid debit cards and electronic travelers’ checks that also challenge the notion that e-money 
is to be used only for micropayments. 
The EMD also has problems of applicability regarding issuers such as mobile network operators. 
The EC Note has not succeeded in eliminating uncertainty regarding the applicability to mobile 
network operators of the Directive.  The EC Guidance Note argues that the EMD does not apply 
to systems where there is no direct debtor/creditor relationship, but this seems to be 
inconsistent with other payment systems. 
Furthermore, the new European Payments Directive (2007/64/EC) does not resolve this legal 
uncertainty for MNOs since it clearly specifies in recital 6 that “The content of these goods or 
services may be produced either by a third party or by the operator, who may add intrinsic 
value to them in the form of access, distribution or search facilities. In the latter case, where the 
goods or services are distributed by one of those operators, or, for technical reasons, by a third 
party, and where they can be used only through digital devices, such as mobile phones or 
computers, that legal framework should not apply as the activity of the operator goes beyond a 
mere payment transaction. However, it is appropriate for that legal framework to apply to cases 
where the operator acts only as an intermediary who simply arranges for payment to be made 
to a third-party supplier.”  
Transport providers also pose problems, and some national regulators argue that an exemption 
should be created and not consider them e-money when they are accepted by different 
transport providers. As a result, we can conclude that the definition of e-money is not clear 
enough, and that this uncertainty should be resolved, whether through a revised definition, 
inclusion of specific exemptions, or especially adapted rules for certain issuers whose core 
business is not payment services (MNOs). 
Legal uncertainty has therefore discouraged new market entrants and hampered innovation. 
Additionally, the discretion given to member states to waive some of the provisions based on 
certain criteria is another factor that is contributing to legal uncertainty by creating national 
differences 
•  Avoid hampering technological innovation: 
The Directive introduces a technology-neutral approach (recital 5), since it does not enter into 
technical specifications. The definition of e-money clearly states that “it is stored on an  
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electronic device.” The directive is therefore applicable to all types of technologies, so it does 
not promote any in particular and therefore tries not to hamper technological innovation, 
avoiding the risks that strict technological rules might have on innovation and competition. 
Although technological neutrality has been achieved, the lack of adaptation in the definition of 
electronic money might have hampered the development of account-based systems. Therefore, 
despite the fact that the EMD has remained mostly technology-neutral, there are doubts over 
the applicability to certain business models generally that have to do not with the electronic 
device used but with the nature of the product and the issuer. 
The beneficial treatment of MNOs has led to technological innovation being hampered. 
However, mobile operators see the application of the EMD to their business unnecessary since 
the risks involved are minimal. Besides EMD requirements such as capital and funding, 
limitation of investments, redeemability and anti-money laundering provisions will force 
mobile operators to create payment services that would only be developed in partnership with 
financial institutions. 
On the other hand, the problems related with gift cards and vouchers have not allowed this 
market to become electronic. Moreover, differing national implementations might jeopardize 
the technology-neutral approach proposed by the EMD. This is the case with account-based 
systems, where the value is stored on a centralized server, and where the applicability of the 
EMD is not clear. One possible solution to this is adding a definition of “electronic device,” 
including not only chip cards or computer memory, but also central servers, mobile telephones, 
PDAs, etc. However, the risk is that since it is impossible to foresee future technological 
developments it may jeopardize technological neutrality in the longer term. 
In conclusion, there are no technological restrictions in the EMD that might have hampered 
innovation. However, overly strict requirements and burdens for ELMIs are excessive in view of 
the risks involved in e-money issuance, and may have offset the entry on new operators and 
therefore hampered innovation. 
•  Preserve a level a playing field: 
The Directive aimed at creating “The highest degree possible of a level playing field between 
different types of institutions” that can issue e-money, whether they are traditional credit 
institutions or the electronic money institutions (recital 12). In order to ensure fair competition 
and adequate supervision of ELMIs, the explanatory memorandum states that the supervisory 
regime to which credit institutions are subject should also be applied in an appropriate manner 
to electronic money institutions (recital 11). 
This appropriate manner aims at creating a lighter and more targeted regulatory and 
supervisory framework for ELMIs with reduced capital requirements, capital adequacy ratios, 
non-application of solvency ratios and large exposure risks (recital 12). On the other hand, the 
investment possibilities of ELMIS are also much more restricted than those of banks (recital 12). 
The issue of competition and “creating a level playing field” is one of the most controversial 
issues of the EMD. Although there are no serious issues in terms of competition between ELMIs 
and traditional banks, the most important concern in this regard is the appropriate treatment of 
prepaid services of mobile network operators vs. ELMIs.   
In order to solve these issues, MNOs propose the establishment of a clear distinction between issuers 
whose core businesses are payment services and those whose are not. The lack of a different  
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regulatory framework discourages mobile operators due to the regulatory risk, and imposes 
disproportionate obligations in terms of redeemability, guarantee schemes and accounting 
separation. 
On the other hand, most ELMIs consider that the requirements are excessive. In particular the 
capital requirements seem to represent a significant barrier to market entry. Reducing initial 
capital requirements would solve the problems, and also the problem of becoming a fully 
licensed ELMI when operating under a waiver. Reducing capital requirements to 0.5 million is 
the solution proposed by the industry.  
Finally, the waiver has the potential of facilitating the development of e-money issuers when 
implemented in a comprehensive and harmonized way, such as the Czech case shows. Raising 
the purse limit could be a way for strengthening this instrument without hampering 
competition with fully-licensed ELMIs. Moreover, national differences between member states 
should disappear in order to create a harmonized and unified regulatory framework. 
•  Ensure the stability and soundness of issuers: 
The Directive emphasizes in its explanatory memorandum that the financial stability of ELMIs 
has to be secured with a regulatory framework that is light enough to ensure that electronic 
money institutions can compete on a level playing field with traditional credit institutions, but 
also strong enough to ensure stability and soundness of issuers. 
Recital 12 of EMD states that regulatory framework must be “…achieved since the above 
mentioned less cumbersome features of the prudential supervisory regime applying to electronic 
money institutions are balanced by provisions that are more stringent than those applying to 
other credit institutions, notably as regards restrictions on the business activities which 
electronic money institutions may carry on and, particularly, prudent limitations of their 
investments aimed at ensuring that their financial liabilities related to outstanding electronic 
money are backed at all times by sufficiently liquid low risk assets.” On the other hand, recital 
13 also demands that ELMIs “have in place internal structures which should respond to the 
financial and non-financial risks to which are exposed.” The most important provisions 
contained in the Directive that ensure the stability and soundness of issuers are the ones that 
limit their business activities, investments, and determine that electronic money must be 
redeemable at par value. 
The EMD has indeed been successful in ensuring the stability and soundness of e-money 
issuers. However, the regime might be too strict, which explains partially the limited 
development of e-money issuance. A less restrictive regime might have been sufficient to 
ensure the stability and soundness of e-money issuers. There is room for adopting a more risk-
based approach without endangering the stability of issuers or the adequate protection of 
consumers. A specialist sourcebook (such as in the United Kingdom), instead of the traditional 
one applied to credit institutions, would solve the problem. 
Investment restrictions are perceived as the most important regulatory obstacle. That is why, 
under certain conditions, some issuers might even prefer the banking regime because it allows 
more flexibility on how to use and invest the float. Besides, accepting receivables as an allowed 
investment is of great importance for some issuers such as PayPal. When an e-money account 
is funded through a credit or a debit card, e-money is issued immediately and increases the 
float and thereby the required investments on liquid assets. However, since payments from 
cards are delayed by one to three business days, PayPal’s parent company has had to inject  
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very significant amounts of cash in order to meet the requirements of the EMD directive. This 
problem would be resolved if card receivables were accepted as ELMIs allowed investments. 
•  Facilitate access by ELMIS from one member state into other member state:  
The Directive aims at facilitating ELMIS from one member state to operate in another by 
allowing “mutual recognition of home supervision in the framework of harmonized prudential 
rules as are applied to credit institutions.” To achieve this objective the Directive extends the 
concept of the “single license” also referred as “single passport” to e-money institutions. The 
passport regime of the provisions are appreciated but not widely used since the industry has not 
developed. However PayPal, the only ELMI that has been able to expand extensively in Europe, 
has found problems related to the fact that passport regimes for ELMIs are inferior to those 
applied by banks [2000/12/EC – article 2 (2)].  
4. Conclusions 
Prepaid products can become an effective instrument for banking the poor since they can be 
used for collecting microdeposits and, as a result, operate as a low cost account. Prepaid 
platforms have characteristics that make them especially useful for developing low-cost 
microfinance business models. Indeed, customers using prepaid systems do not need bank 
accounts, debit or credit cards. Prepaid issuers do not need to develop or invest in new 
technologies since this mechanism can be used on a number of platforms such as PCs, mobile 
phones, hand-held and set-top boxes. In addition, prepaid products are especially designed for 
offering services demanded by the poor, such as micropayments, microdeposits or even 
microcredits. Finally, they allow users to control their cash flow by receiving statements (some 
providers offer this feature online, others provide physical statements) or accessing balances 
through PCs, mobile phones, hand-held and set-top boxes. 
Other than collecting microdeposits, prepaid products (or SVCs as they are called in the United 
States) also offer other services that can be very valuable for serving the unbanked population. 
As presented in this document, prepaid products generally lack the identification and credit 
requirements that effectively bar millions of individuals from opening traditional bank 
accounts, especially in the United States. In addition, prepaid products can be purchased and 
reloaded at a growing number of locations other than bank branches, such as check cashers, 
convenience stores, and other retailers. Prepaid instruments can also provide immediate 
availability of funds at a cost that is, in some cases, lower than some other alternatives for 
unbanked consumers. Additionally,  prepaid products are difficult to overdraw, reducing the 
likelihood of unexpected fees.  Finally, many prepaid issuers offer some sort of bill pay option, 
especially branded cards that enable signature-based transactions, and a significant number 
offer remittances. 
Despite the potential presented above that prepaid instruments have for banking the poor, the 
development of these types of financial products in Europe and the United States has been very 
limited. In Europe, despite the legislative effort undertaken with the European Directive of e-
money/prepaid products, its results have been very poor. The EMD aimed at promoting 
innovation and the development of the prepaid industry through the establishment of a new 
type of lightly regulated financial institution called e-money issuers. However, according to a  
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2006 evaluation study prepared for The DG Internal Market of the European Commission by 
The Evaluation Partnership Limited,
15 this new legislation has not promoted the development of 
new issuers of e-money. Indeed, as shown in this study, the EMD directive has serious problems 
of applicability regarding issuers such as Mobile Telecom Operators, Transport Companies and 
electronic vouchers. 
In the United States, however, the stored value card market, especially “closed-loop” or gift 
products, has exploded in the last few years. While the overall number of cards in circulation 
remains relatively small, new cards are introduced into the market every week. However, 
“open-loop cards,” the type of prepaid products more adapted for banking the poor, has 
enjoyed very limited growth. This study has analyzed the reasons that can explain the 
development of the industry in the United States and Europe in terms of its regulatory 
framework, market potential and the structure of the card industry (supply). 
In terms of regulation, in the United States e-money issuers are not regulated at the federal 
level, but at the state level. U.S. regulators have not been so proactive in regulating e-money 
issuers, and preferred to use and sometimes adapt existing Money Services Business/Money 
Transmitting Regulations to allow innovation until the market matured. As a result, e-money is 
not specifically defined in the United States as it is in Europe. However, Money Service 
Businesses and specifically Money Transmitting requirements are only slightly lighter than 
those required in Europe for e-money issuers (ELMIs).
16 Moreover, this lighter regulation creates 
potential regulatory problems in the United States regarding consumer protection and customer 
identification issues. As a result, we can conclude that the different regulatory frameworks 
regarding issuers of prepaid products have had little impact on the differences in the 
development of the prepaid industry in the United States and Europe. 
In terms of market potential, however, we see very relevant differences between the United 
States and Europe that, in our opinion, better explain the differences mentioned above. While 
in Europe almost 100% of the population has access to basic financial services, in the United 
States as many as 20 million U.S. households - disproportionately poor, minority, lower income 
and young - are unbanked. Additional households, estimated in the millions, conduct most of 
their financial transactions outside of banks even though they may have a savings or checking 
account. Yet having a relationship with the financial services system can minimize the cost of 
financial transactions and help turn income into savings, assets and wealth. 
Prepaid cards or SVCs can be marketed to the unbanked populations, since they could be a 
valuable financial tool for these consumers. Indeed, some SVC providers are focusing their 
marketing efforts on immigrant populations, youth, and individuals with poor credit, since 
SVCs generally lack the identification and credit requirements that effectively bar millions of 
individuals from opening traditional bank accounts. In addition, SVCs can be purchased and 
reloaded at a growing number of locations other than bank branches, such as check cashers, 
convenience stores and other retailers. SVCs can also provide immediate availability of funds at 
a cost that is, in some cases, lower than some other alternatives for unbanked consumers. 
Finally, SVCs are prepaid and difficult to overdraw, reducing the likelihood of unexpected fees. 
However, despite the market potential that SVC products have in the United States among the 
unbanked, its retail payments structure, and in particular, the importance of offline debit, has 
                                              
15 europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/bank/docs/e-money/evaluation_en.pdf 
16 Evaluation of the e-money directive by the Evaluation Partnership Limited.   
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been an important obstacle to its development. Indeed, since SVC systems require online 
authorization acceptance networks, and these systems have only recently started to develop in the 
United States, most of the SCVs are “closed-loop” cards, issued by retailers in order to avoid 
paying discount rates. These products do not serve the needs of the unbanked population and, as 
a result, do not tap into the market potential described earlier. Only when this supply-related 
problem is solved, could SVCs be used as the basis of a value proposition to serve the unbanked. 
Another supply-related problem that has prevented the take up of the prepaid industry in the 
United States is the lack of a clear business case. Indeed, the slow development of the prepaid 
industry and the lack of involvement of the bank industry are explained by the fact that the 
business case for prepaid products has not been clearly identified. The lack of consensus around 
the key profitability drivers might help explain why SVCs are such an expensive option, 
perhaps even more costly than using a check casher for basic transactions. Prices could come 
down if additional income revenues were exploited. Additional functions other than payments, 
such as savings and credit-building features, must be developed in order to better define the 
business case for prepaid products in the United States. 
In terms of savings, extensive market research indicates that demand for savings features in 
SVC products is potentially very strong among unbanked customers. 
Families with relatively low incomes have assets that could be stored in a savings vehicle, but 
some may not have access to traditional accounts at banks or credit unions. Also, in terms of 
credit building features, since cards are marketed primarily to unbanked customers, SVCs have 
the potential to be an effective personal financial management tool for some people. However, 
only a few SVC companies have experimented with offering savings and credit features with 
their cards and their experiences are limited in scope. 
The lack of development of both credit and savings features is partially due to the customer 
barriers that SVC issuers must face when providing unbanked consumers with savings and credit 
opportunities through SVCs. Savings or credit-building features would require more stringent 
identification verification and this requirement would decrease the relative anonymity offered by 
SCVs, which is one of its most desired features. Furthermore, SVC users may not want transaction 
history data to be reported for credit-building purposes. They may wrongly perceive that such 
data could negatively affect their credit scores based on their previous banking experiences. 
Indeed, existing credit models do not allow for the reporting of credit relationships lasting fewer 
than 30 days. Furthermore, the structure of the U.S. credit reporting system and the U.S. 
regulatory system present important barriers for the development of credit features tied to SVCs. 
As a result, in our opinion, the most important perceived customer barrier to providing unbanked 
consumers with savings opportunities through SVCs is the lack of consumer education. 
 